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Section 230 of the CDA:  
Internet Exceptionalism as a 
Statutory Construct 
By H. Brian Holland* 
Introduction 
Since its enactment in 1996, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
has become perhaps the most significant statute in the regulation of online 
content, and one of the most intensely scrutinized.  Many early commentators 
criticized both Congress, for its apparent inability to craft the more limited 
statute it intended, and the courts, for interpreting the statute broadly and failing 
to limit its reach.  Later commentators focus more clearly on policy concerns, 
contending that the failure to impose liability on intermediaries fails to 
effectuate principles of efficiency and cost avoidance.  More recently, 
commentators have argued that Section 230 immunity should be limited 
because it contributes to the proliferation of anonymous hate speech, 
intimidation, and threats of violence against traditionally marginalized groups. 
Acknowledging the validity of these concerns, this essay nevertheless takes the 
opposing view, defending broad Section 230 immunity as essential to the 
evolving structure of Internet governance.  Specifically, Section 230 provides a 
means of working within the sovereign legal system to effectuate many of the 
goals, ideals, and realities of the Internet exceptionalist and cyber-libertarian 
movements.  By mitigating the imposition of certain external legal norms in the 
online environment, Section 230 helps to create the initial conditions necessary 
for the development of a modified form of exceptionalism.  With the impact of 
external norms diminished, Web 2.0 communities, such as wikis1 and social 
network services,2 have emerged to facilitate a limited market in norms and 
values and to provide internal enforcement mechanisms that allow new 
communal norms to emerge.  Section 230 plays a vital role in this process of 
                                                     
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan School of  Law.  A modified version of  this essay 
originally appeared in the University of  Kansas Law Review.  In Defense of  Online Intermediary 
Immunity: Facilitating Communities of  Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 369 (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=979183. 
1 A wiki is a website designed to allow visitors to easily create and edit any page on the site.  
For more information, see Wikipedia, Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last 
accessed Dec. 1, 2010). 
2 Social network services are online services designed for users to share messages, links, and 
media (photos and video) with friends or others with similar interests.  Some popular social 
network services are Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. 
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building heterogeneous communities that encourage collaborative production 
and communication.  Efforts to substantially reform or restrict Section 230 
immunity are therefore largely unnecessary and unwise. 
The essay begins with a brief introduction to Section 230.  As interpreted and 
applied by the judiciary, this statute is now conceived as a broad grant of 
immunity from tort liability—broad not only in terms of those who can claim 
its protection but also in terms of predicate acts and causes of action to which 
such immunity extends.   
Working from this foundation, I then seek to position the courts’ expansion of 
Section 230 immunity within the larger debate over Internet governance, 
suggesting that proponents of expanded immunity are successfully creating what 
might be characterized as a modified, less demanding form of cyber-libertarian 
exceptionalism than what Eric Goldman calls, in his essay in this book, the 
“First Wave of Internet Exceptionalism” (one of “Internet Utopianism”), as 
articulated in the mid-1990s.  The dramatic expansion of Section 230 immunity 
has in a limited sense effectuated a vision of a community in which norms of 
relationship, thought and expression are yet to be formed.  The tort liability 
from which Section 230 provides immunity is, together with contract, a primary 
means by which society defines civil wrongs actionable at law.  In the near 
absence of these external norms of conduct regulating relationships among 
individuals, the online community is free to create its own norms, its own rules 
of conduct, or none at all.  It is a glimpse of an emergent community existing 
within, rather than without, the sovereign legal system. 
Finally, I make the case for preserving broad Section 230 immunity.  As an 
initial matter, many of the reforms offered by commentators are both 
unnecessary and unwise because the costs of imposing indirect liability on 
intermediaries are unreasonable in relationship to the harm deterred or 
remedied by doing so.  Moreover, the imposition of liability would undermine 
the development of Web 2.0 communities as a form of modified exceptionalism 
that encourages the development of communal norms, efficient centers of 
collaborative production, and open forums for communication. 
The Expansion of Section 230 Immunity 
In May of 1995, a New York trial court rocked the emerging online industry 
with its decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,3 holding the 
Prodigy computer network liable for defamatory comments posted on one of its 
bulletin boards by a third-party.  The key factor in this result was Prodigy’s 
attempt to create a more family-friendly environment through the exercise of 
editorial control over the bulletin boards and moderating for offensive content.  
                                                     
3 No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
  THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 191 
 
Prodigy was therefore treated as a publisher of the information, rather than a 
mere distributor, and held strictly liable for actionable third-party content.   
Representatives of the online industry argued that the Prodigy decision placed 
service providers in an untenable position by creating a “Hobson’s choice”4 
between monitoring content and doing nothing, thereby insulating the service 
from liability.  Congress responded to the decision by amending the draft 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) to include a tailored immunity provision 
addressing the online industry’s concerns.  As one element of what came to be 
known as the Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA, Section 230 was 
generally intended to provide online service providers and bulletin board hosts 
with immunity from tort liability for the defamatory acts of their users.  This 
was accomplished by addressing those specific elements of common law 
defamation at issue in the Prodigy decision—editorial control and the distinct 
treatment of publishers and distributors under the law.  To that end, Section 
230 provided that no interactive computer service should be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of third-party content, and that efforts to moderate 
content should not create such liability. 
In the years following the enactment of Section 230, courts consistently 
extended its application.  This trend began in 1997 with the watershed decision 
in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,5 in which the Fourth Circuit applied Section 230 
to claims that America Online (AOL) should be held liable for the defamatory 
content posted by one of its users.  The plaintiffs claimed liability arose in part 
because AOL had allegedly failed to remove third-party defamatory messages 
from its bulletin board system within a reasonable time, refused to post 
retractions to defamatory messages, and failed to screen for similar defamatory 
messages thereafter.  The court found the plaintiff’s tort claims were preempted 
by Section 230, which rendered AOL immune.  In reaching this result, the court 
rejected a strict reading of Section 230 as being limited to its terms.  Although 
the statute failed to make any explicit reference to distributor liability, which the 
Prodigy decision appeared to leave intact, the court read distributor immunity 
into the statute, finding distributor liability to be an included subset of the 
publisher liability foreclosed by the statute.  By collapsing the publisher-
distributor distinction, the Fourth Circuit adopted the most expansive reading 
possible of both defamation law and Section 230.  Thus, even though AOL 
knew the statements were false, defamatory, and causing great injury, AOL 
could simply refuse to take proper remedial and preventative action without fear 
of liability. 
                                                     
4 SAMUEL FISHER, THE RUSTICK’S ALARM TO THE RABBIES (1660), as cited in Hobson’s choice, 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobson%27s_choice (last accessed Dec. 1, 
2010). 
5 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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Following Zeran, and building on that court’s reading of both the statute and the 
policies sought to be effected, courts have extended the reach of Section 230 
immunity along three lines: (1) by expanding the class who may claim its 
protections; (2) by limiting the class statutorily excluded from its protections; 
and (3) by expanding the causes of action from which immunity is provided.6  
As to the first, courts have interpreted the provision of immunity to interactive 
computer services to include such entities as Web hosting services, email service 
providers, commercial websites like eBay and Amazon, individual and company 
websites, Internet dating services, privately-created chat rooms, and Internet 
access points in copy centers and libraries.  The additional provision of 
immunity to users of those services promises similar results.  Already, one 
decision has held that a newsgroup user cannot be held liable for re-posting 
libelous comments by a third party,7 while another court found a website 
message board to be both a provider and a user of an interactive computer 
service.8 
The second line of extension results from a narrow reading of the term 
“information content provider,” which defines the class for whom there is no 
immunity.  Specifically, courts have held that minor alterations to third-party 
content does not constitute the provision of content itself, so long as the 
provider does not induce the unlawful content through the provision of 
offending raw materials of authorship and where the basic form and message of 
the original is retained.9  The third point of expansion has been to extend 
Section 230 immunity beyond causes of action for defamation and related 
claims to provide immunity from such claims as negligent assistance in the 
sale/distribution of child pornography,10 negligent distribution of pornography 
of and to adults,11 negligent posting of incorrect stock information,12 sale of 
fraudulently autographed sports memorabilia,13 invasion of privacy,14 and 
misappropriation of the right of publicity.15   
                                                     
6 But see Fair Housing. Council of  San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to extend Section 230 immunity to Roommates.com for 
certain categories of  content solicited by the site for users in violation of  federal fair housing 
laws). 
7 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527 (Cal. 2006). 
8 DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
9 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 
711, 724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Batzel v. Smith). 
10 Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001). 
11 Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 WL 816779, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000), aff ’d 
sub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
12 Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
13 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
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Section 230, Internet  
Governance & Exceptionalism 
Situated within the larger debate over Internet governance, the concept of 
Internet exceptionalism presumes that cyberspace cannot be confined by 
physical borders or controlled by traditional sovereign governments, and thus 
that cyber-libertarian communities will emerge in which norms of relationship, 
thought and expression are yet to be formed.  Although these ideas have been 
subjected to intense criticism and somewhat obscured by recent developments 
in the governance debates, they remain a touchstone for the cyber-libertarian 
ideal.  This part of the essay seeks to clear space in the governance debates for 
this vision of exceptionalism, and argues that Section 230 is in some limited way 
facilitating the emergence of cyber-libertarian communities in a modified, less 
demanding form. 
Foundational Arguments of  
Internet Governance 
The debate over Internet governance evolved in two surprisingly distinct, albeit 
convergent stages.  The first stage of the governance debate focused on law and 
social norms, and whether these traditional models of regulating human 
relations could be validly applied to the online environment.  In this context, 
exceptionalism was conceptualized as a state of being to which the Internet had 
naturally evolved, apart from terrestrial space.  The second stage of the debate 
introduced network architecture as an important and potentially dominant 
means of regulating the online environment.  In this context, exceptionalism 
became an objective to be pursued and protected as a matter of choice, rather 
than a natural state.  At a more exacting level, these debates implicated 
fundamental questions of legitimacy, preference, politics, democracy, collective 
decision-making, and libertarian ideals. 
In the early 1990s, as the Internet began to reach the masses with the advent of 
the World Wide Web, a particular vision of the online environment emerged to 
advocate and defend Internet exceptionalism.  Described as digital 
libertarianism or cyber-libertarianism, the vision was one of freedom, liberty, 
and self-regulation.  Cyber-libertarians believed the Internet could and would 
develop its own effective legal institutions through which rules would emerge.  
These norms would emerge from collective discourse around behavior, 
                                                                                                                             
14 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
15 See id. at 1122, 1125 (extending § 230 immunity to defendant in claim “alleging invasion of  
privacy, misapproriation of  the right of  publicity, defamation and negligence”).  See also 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that § 230 
immunity extends to state-law intellectual property claims, including unfair competition, false 
advertising, and right of  publicity). 
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relationship, and content, rather than from the control and regulation of 
network architecture.  Control of architecture was seen almost exclusively as an 
instrument by which to enforce emerging social norms, and not as a means of 
determining the norms themselves.  By the mid-1990s this process of self-
regulation was well underway.   
At the same time, however, sovereign nations and their constituents increasingly 
sought to impose existing offline legal regimes on this emerging, resource-rich 
environment.  Many in the online community resisted, perceiving this regulation 
as a threat to the exceptional nature of the Internet.  Advocates of self-
regulation envisioned cyberspace as a distinct sphere, apart from physical space.  
These cyber-libertarian exceptionalists saw the imposition of existing offline 
legal systems grounded in territorially-based sovereignty as inappropriate.  They 
believed that the online environment should instead be permitted to develop its 
own discrete system of legal rules and regulatory processes.  Self-regulation was 
preferable in its own right because it had proven so effective in creating the 
environment sought to be preserved, and also because the alternative seemed 
devastating.  The imposition of external, territorially-based legal regimes would 
be, the exceptionalists argued, infeasible, ineffective, and fundamentally 
damaging to the online environment.   
Faced with the attempted imposition of offline legal regimes, cyber-libertarians 
responded by attacking the validity of exercising sovereign authority and 
external control over cyberspace.  According to Professors David Johnson and 
David Post, two leading proponents of self-governance, external regulation of 
the online environment would be invalid because Internet exceptionalism—the 
state of being to which the Internet naturally evolved—destroys the link 
between territorially-based sovereigns and their validating principles of power, 
legitimacy, effect, and notice.16  Most importantly, the Internet’s decentralized 
architecture deprives territorially-based sovereigns of the power, or ability, to 
regulate online activity.  Likewise, extraterritorial application of sovereign law 
fails to represent the consent of the governed, or to effectuate exclusivity of 
authority based on a relative comparison of local effects.  The loss of these 
limiting principles results in overlapping and inconsistent regulation of the same 
activity with significant spillover effect.  Deprived of these validating principles, 
it would be illegitimate to apply sovereign authority and external control in 
cyberspace. 
                                                     
16 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of  Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996). 
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A primary challenge to these cyber-libertarian arguments came from Professor 
Goldsmith, who engaged both their descriptive and normative aspects.17  In 
terms of the legitimacy of sovereign regulation, Goldsmith criticized Johnson 
and Post’s limited view of sovereignty and over-reliance on the relationship 
between physical proximity and territorial effects.  Moreover, he argued that 
they had overstated the impossibility of regulation, mistaking ability for cost; 
failed to recognize the deterrent effect on extraterritorial actors of local 
enforcement against end users and network components located within the 
territory; and mistakenly equated valid regulation with some measure of near-
perfect enforcement.  Finally, where true conflicts between sovereigns existed, 
Goldsmith argued that these could be resolved with the same tools used in the 
offline world—rules of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, enforcement, etc.  
Throughout, Goldsmith struck at Johnson and Post’s exceptionalist view of the 
Internet, implicitly rejecting the ultimate significance of both the technical and 
communal aspects of that ideal.  This critique proved devastating to these early 
cyber-libertarian arguments.   
The governance debate entered its second phase in 1999 with the publication of 
Professor Lessig’s book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace.18  Prior to Lessig’s 
book, the governance debate had focused primarily on behavioral and property 
norms, with the assumption that either existing sovereign law or the law 
emerging from Internet self-governance would prevail.  Network architecture 
merely provided the means to enforce these norms, particularly those emerging 
from self-governance.  Lessig reconceived Internet exceptionalism as a two-part 
phenomenon, one regulatory and the other cultural.  The former recognizes that 
many of those features that make the Internet exceptional (in the cyber-
libertarian sense) are merely coding choices, and not the innate nature of 
cyberspace.  Within the network, architecture and code are the most basic forms 
of regulation.  Code can be easily changed.  Thus, Lessig argued, to protect the 
cultural aspects of exceptionalism, we must first recognize the exceptional 
regulatory power of architecture and code within cyberspace, and its pivotal role 
in preserving or destroying that culture.   
Lessig first pointed out that law and social norms are but two means of 
regulating human behavior.  In cyberspace, unlike real space, it is possible for 
architecture to dominate regulatory structures.  Architecture acts as a regulator 
in the offline world as well—in the form of time, nature, physics, etc.—but our 
laws and social norms are generally conceived with these regulators assumed.  
Alteration of that architecture is unusually difficult if not practically impossible.  
In cyberspace, by comparison, architecture in the form of code is remarkably 
                                                     
17 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, 
The Internet and the Abiding Significance of  Territorial Sovereignty, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 475 
(1998). 
18 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
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fluid.  Code effectuates a series of choices, from data collection, to anonymity, 
to access.  And code can be changed.  Not only is code fluid, but within 
cyberspace it is a uniquely powerful form of regulation.  Rather than regulating 
behavior and relationships through punishment, deterrence and post-violation 
corrective action, code provides the means to exercise perfect control and thus 
perfect regulation—regulation not just of effects, but of the very universe of 
choices from which an individual actor is able to select.   
With this shift in focus, the debate itself evolved.  Lessig cautioned that the 
greatest threat to the exceptional culture of cyberspace comes from the union of 
perfect control and market forces of commerce.  The architectural components 
that provide the means of perfect control are held almost exclusively by private 
entities with commercial and political interests distinct from the collective.  The 
invisible hand, Lessig argued, cannot resist the promise of perfect control, and 
has little or no motivation to protect the fundamental values promoted by 
cyber-libertarian exceptionalism.  According to the cyber-libertarian narrative, 
barriers that are present in the real world do not exist or are de minimus in the 
online environment.  In the context of Internet architecture, exceptionalism can 
be found in original principles of network design that rely on open protocols 
and non-discriminatory data transfer—a network that is decentralized, 
borderless, and with the potential for nearly unlimited data capacity.  Indeed, 
the digital data flowing through this system is itself exceptional, because it is 
easy to create and manipulate, easy to copy with no degradation in quality, and 
easy to access and distribute.  In the context of online relationships, 
exceptionalism resides (at the very least) in the interactivity, immediacy, and 
potential scope of interaction, as well as the opportunity for anonymity.  
However, the very promise of perfect control is to eliminate many of these 
choices and the fundamental values they reflect as subservient to commercial 
goals.  In cyberspace, control over coded architecture supplies the means for 
making this election.  Building on this assertion, Lessig argued that in order to 
protect fundamental values, decisions regarding architecture should emerge 
from the body politic and collective decision-making, rather than being 
concentrated in private actors.   
For many cyber-libertarians, Lessig’s message presented great problems.  
Although many had already abandoned the argument that the exercise of 
sovereign authority in cyberspace was normatively invalid, they had not given 
up (as a matter of preference) the vision of an emergent, self-governed, digital 
libertarian space.  Sovereign legal regimes were still seen as the greatest threat to 
that vision.  Territorial governments should, the cyber-libertarians argued, 
simply leave cyberspace alone to flourish.  From this perspective, Lessig’s 
arguments about the unique regulatory power of architecture and code in 
cyberspace were largely convincing.  But his description of the corrupting 
influence of perfect control and concentrated private power, and particularly his 
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call for government regulation to counteract those influences and preserve 
fundamental values, were difficult to square with most libertarian views.   
The debate on net neutrality provides a glimpse of this division.  Many 
commentators, including Lessig, are concerned that the private owners that 
control the physical/infrastructure layer of the network will, in pursuit of cross-
layer vertical integration and increased revenues, privilege certain content or 
applications.  They therefore endorse regulatorily-mandated neutrality as a 
means of preserving one aspect of Internet exceptionalism.  Not surprisingly, 
many libertarians reject this approach, endorsing instead market-based solutions 
for effectuating individual choice. 
The irony of this debate is fairly apparent.  Many who might otherwise have 
characterized themselves as cyber-libertarian, or at least sympathetic to that 
vision, are now conflicted.  Net neutrality would necessarily be imposed by 
external sovereign legal systems and subordinated to the control of commercial 
entities, rather than emerging as a common norm.  In the extremes, the issue 
seems to present a choice between entrenched political power and unregulated 
market forces, with neither providing adequate protection for individuals.  Thus, 
many of the Internet exceptionalists who sought to segregate the Internet from 
territorial boundaries, who assumed existing sovereign governments and legal 
regimes were the greatest threat to the online community, who believed that the 
computer scientist would remain in control of the network (and thus in control 
of enforcement), found themselves asking Congress to protect the Internet 
from private actors and market forces. 
What’s Left of Exceptionalism? 
What then is left of Internet exceptionalism?  In his revolutionary essay A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow described 
cyberspace as consisting not of computers, wires, or code, but of “transactions, 
relationships, and thought itself.”19  It was this vision, this perception of an 
evolving social space, that guided Barlow’s ideal of the culture he sought to 
preserve—a distinct vision of potential worthy of protection.  Indeed, to many 
early inhabitants of cyberspace, communal control and regulation of network 
architecture appeared a given, if for no other reason than that perfect external 
control seemed almost impossible.  Freedom of choice in individual expression, 
human behavior, and relationships were the heart of the online cultural and 
social ideal that stirred Barlow and other cyber-libertarians. 
As it evolved, the governance debate fractured this largely unified vision, 
distinguishing validity from preference, law and social norms from architecture 
                                                     
19 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of  the Independence of  Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), 
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
198 CHAPTER 3: IS INTERNET EXCEPTIONALISM DEAD? 
 
and code, technical exceptionalism from cultural exceptionalism, government 
power from private commercial power, and even libertarian from libertarian.  
Lessig argued persuasively that the greatest threat to digital libertarianism arose 
from private actors, unbounded by fundamental values (including constitutional 
values) and with the ability to exercise perfect control over choice.  Lessig’s 
analysis, generally speaking, was focused on the treatment of data as data, based 
primarily on the identity of its owner and the commercial interests represented.  
Choice in action was to be controlled by the regulation of owned data, 
discriminatory treatment of data to the benefit of certain owners, restriction of 
network access, and similar means.  These technical controls would then be 
bolstered by traditional sovereign law validating those measures. 
What seems somewhat obscured in Lessig’s architecture-and-code approach 
(which clearly remains the central concern of the governance debate) is Barlow’s 
original vision of relational libertarianism, with its focus on expression of 
individual choice and the development of new communal social norms within a 
system of self-governance.  This is the part of Internet exceptionalism that was, 
in a sense, overwhelmed by the debate over architecture and code.  Yet there 
are some choices, primarily relational, that remain largely unaffected by that 
debate.  In this sphere, the question is not access to choice, the ability to 
choose, or the available universe of choices, but rather what norms apply to the 
choices being made outside those controls. 
Post argues that fundamental normative values could “best be protected by 
allowing the widest possible scope for uncoordinated and uncoerced individual 
choice among different values and among different embodiments of those 
values.”20  He believes that the imposition of sovereign legal regimes in 
cyberspace, rather than promoting fundamental values as Lessig argued, would 
instead deny the digital libertarian culture the opportunity to develop apart from 
the offline world, with its own set of fundamental values.  He argues it is better 
to serve the private interest (even if powerful and commercially motivated) than 
the interest of terrestrial sovereigns.  Indeed, he sees exceptionalism as requiring 
self-governance, to the exclusion of external legal norms imposed by sovereign 
powers, as a precondition to the emergence of a new system of norms. 
Section 230 as a Form of  
Cyber-Libertarian Exceptionalism 
Most would say that Barlow and Post lost the battle.  However, this particular 
strain of Internet exceptionalism, envisioned as self-governance and emerging 
social norms applicable to relationships between individuals (as opposed to data 
as data), has been preserved in a modified, less demanding form.  Ironically, it is 
because of sovereign law, not in spite of it, that this occurred.  The dramatic 
                                                     
20 David Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1365 (2002). 
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expansion of Section 230 immunity has effectuated many of the ideals 
promoted by Post, Barlow, and others, albeit on a limited scale.  This expansion 
has created an environment in which many of the norms and regulatory 
mechanisms present in the offline world are effectively inapplicable.  This is so 
not because the very nature of cyberspace makes such application impossible, or 
because sovereign law is necessarily ineffective or invalid, but rather because 
sovereign law has affirmatively created that condition. 
The torts for which Section 230 provides immunity are, together with contract 
law, the primary means by which society defines civil wrongs actionable at law.  
These norms of conduct regulate relationships among individuals: articulating 
wrongs against the physical and psychic well-being of the person (e.g., assault, 
battery, emotional distress), wrongs against property (e.g., trespass to land, 
trespass to chattels, conversion), wrongs against economic interests (e.g., fraud, 
tortious interference), and wrongs against reputation and privacy (e.g., 
defamation, misappropriation of publicity, invasion of privacy).  Section 230 has 
been interpreted and applied to provide expansive immunity from tort liability 
for actions taken on or in conjunction with computer networks, including the 
Internet.  Statutory language defining who may claim the protections of Section 
230 immunity, including providers of interactive computer services and the 
users of such services, has been broadly extended.  In contrast, the primary 
limitation on the range of claimants to Section 230 immunity, which is 
statutorily unavailable to the allegedly tortious information content provider, 
has been construed fairly narrowly.  Moreover, the immunity provided to this 
expansive cross-section of online participants now reaches well beyond 
defamation to include a wide range of other tortious conduct and claims.  As 
such, many of the norms of conduct regulating relationships among individuals 
in the offline world—those civil wrongs actionable at (tort) law—simply do not 
apply to many in the online world. 
Even where the online entity is alleged to be aware of the illegal acts of their 
users, and to be either actively facilitating those illegal acts or refusing to stop 
them, the intermediary retains Section 230 immunity.  This is true even where 
the intermediary has the knowledge, technical ability, and contractual right to 
take remedial action.  In the offline world, such active and knowing facilitation 
would likely violate social norms established in tort law.  In the online world, 
however, the defendants are immune from liability.  Established norms, as 
expressed through the mechanisms of tort law, are neutralized by Section 230 
and its judicial interpretations. 
In the near absence of these external legal norms, at least within the range of 
choices being made outside the data-as-data architectural controls, the online 
community is free to create its own norms, its own rules of conduct, or none at 
all.  The inhabitants may not have a blank slate—criminal law, intellectual 
property law, and contract law still apply—but much of what Barlow embraced 
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as central tenets (mind, identity, expression) remain undefined.  Section 230 
offers a modified version of cyber-libertarian exceptionalism, less demanding of 
the sovereign and existing offline social norms, and therefore less satisfying.  
But it is nonetheless a glimpse of that society, maintained by the sovereign legal 
regime rather than against it.  The law now applies to nearly every tort that can 
be committed in cyberspace.  It is nibbling at the edges of intellectual property 
rights.  It protects against the civil liability components of criminal acts.  It 
generally extends to all but the first speaker, who may well get lost in the 
network to escape liability even without immunity. 
A Case for Preserving  
Section 230 Immunity 
As interpreted by the courts, the immunity provisions of Section 230 have been 
heavily criticized.  Many commentators have argued that by failing to impose 
indirect liability on intermediaries, significant harms will go undeterred or 
unremedied, and that Section 230 should be reformed to serve the interests of 
efficiency and cost allocation.  This part of the essay addresses these criticisms 
directly, concluding that substantially reforming the statute is both unnecessary 
and unwise because the cost of such liability is unreasonable in relation to the 
harm deterred or remedied.  Indeed, given Section 230’s role in facilitating the 
development of Web 2.0 communities, reforming the statute to narrow the 
grant of immunity would significantly damage the online environment—both as 
it exists today and as it could become.   
Evaluating Calls for Reform 
Early critics of Section 230 tended to focus on the issues of congressional intent 
and broad interpretation by the courts.  More recent commentators have moved 
beyond these issues to engage the larger implications of providing such 
sweeping immunity to online intermediaries, suggesting amendments to Section 
230 intended to effectuate policies of efficiency and cost allocation.  This 
critique begins with the premise that in the online environment, individual bad 
actors are often beyond the reach of domestic legal authorities.  This creates a 
situation in which significant individual harms cannot be legally deterred or 
remedied, and the fear that the Internet’s potential as a marketplace will not be 
realized.  Given these negative conditions, where a third party maintains a 
certain level of control, the imposition of indirect liability is desirable.  The 
failure to do so may create inefficiencies by failing to detect and deter harmful 
behavior where the cost of doing so is reasonable.  Commentators have argued 
that, in the online environment, intermediaries are in the best position to deter 
negative behavior, to track down primary wrongdoers, and to mitigate damages.  
This is particularly true in regard to information-based torts, the damages of 
which might be mitigated in many circumstances simply by taking down, 
prohibiting, or blocking the objectionable content.   
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At the heart of this attack on Section 230 immunity is the idea that, in the 
absence of indirect intermediary liability, significant harms will go undeterred or 
unremedied.  These fears are either misplaced or overstated.  As an initial 
matter, it is not clear that a significant number of bad actors are beyond the 
reach of the law.  Advances in technology are making it increasingly possible to 
locate and identify bad actors online, such that online anonymity is difficult to 
maintain.  Likewise, where the bad actor is identified but is found outside the 
jurisdiction, sovereign governments have developed methods for resolving 
disputes to permit the direct extraterritorial application of domestic law, such as 
rules of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, and recognition of judgments.  Indeed, 
anti-exceptionalists have strenuously argued that the application of sovereign 
authority to online activity originating outside the jurisdiction is legitimate and 
valid in large part because of these rules.   
Moreover, although the immunity provided by Section 230 arguably mitigates 
the legal incentives for online intermediaries to deter and remedy certain 
negative behavior, it does not eliminate those legal incentives.  Section 230 
expressly states that it has no effect on criminal law, intellectual property law, or 
communications privacy law.  These external norms remain applicable to and 
enforceable against both content providers and intermediaries in the online 
environment.  Perhaps even more significantly, although Section 230 removes 
legal incentives to enforce the norms expressed in tort law, law is certainly not 
the only incentive for an intermediary to act.  Communal, commercial and other 
incentives also play a role.  Indeed, Section 230 immunity allows intermediaries 
the freedom to intervene in a multitude of ways.  Thus, individual harms and 
marketplace security can be addressed through alternate legal regimes and 
internal incentives. 
Furthermore, proponents of indirect intermediary liability concede that even 
where harms do exist, intermediaries may only rightly be held liable for failing to 
detect and deter harmful behavior where the cost of doing so is reasonable.  It 
is unclear, however, that the costs of intermedial regulation are reasonable.  In 
terms of remedies and reforms, critics generally suggest some form of the 
detect-deter-mitigate model, imposing a duty upon the intermediary with the 
potential for liability in cases of breach.  The two most common models are 
traditional liability (damages) regimes and notice-and-takedown schemes.  
Proponents of traditional liability schemes generally find theoretical fault with 
the exceptionalist view of the Internet, and analytical fault with broad judicial 
interpretations of the statute that collapse distributor-with-knowledge liability 
into immunity from publisher liability.  Proponents of a notice-and-takedown 
scheme likewise work from a distributor-with-knowledge model that imposes a 
limited duty of care on intermediaries, but generally acknowledge some degree 
of exceptionalism that requires a distinct scheme.  Most suggest some variation 
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utilizing elements of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)21 and the 
European Union’s E-Commerce Directive,22 wherein intermediary liability is 
triggered by actual notice of the objectionable content or a standard of 
reasonable care, and requiring remedial action (e.g., taking down the content at 
issue). 
The costs of these indirect intermediary liability schemes could be great.  Under 
traditional liability rules, intermediaries may be forced to adopt a least-common-
denominator approach, resulting in overly-broad restrictions on expression and 
behavior.  A modified distributor-with-knowledge approach, usually in the form 
of a takedown scheme similar to that employed by the DMCA, may produce the 
same type of chilling effect.  This is potentially exacerbated by the use of a 
should-have-known standard that can trigger the need to patrol for harmful 
content, raising costs and leading to even greater overbreadth in application.  
Moreover, indirect liability reduces incentives to develop self-help technology, 
such as location or identity tracking software and end-user filters, the 
development of which was one of Section 230’s primary policy goals.  Thus, if 
the scale of undeterred or unremedied harms is minimal, and the negative 
impact of a detect-deter-mitigate model is significant, then the cost associated 
with the imposition of indirect intermediary liability is not reasonable. 
Resisting the Urge Toward Homogeny 
The case for preserving Section 230 immunity begins by recasting intermediary 
immunity in terms of exceptionalism, self-governance and norms, because it is 
precisely the gap between the offline social norms expressed in tort law and the 
broad immunity provided to online participants that has led to the rather strong 
criticism of Section 230.  As a conceptual matter, communal enforcement 
presents the greatest challenge to effectuating some modified version of the 
exceptionalist ideal.  When external legal norms are excluded, internal 
enforcement mechanisms facilitate the emergence of new communal norms to 
take their place.  Much of the criticism of Section 230 stems from the lack of 
legal enforcement that accompanies immunity, and the resulting inability to 
form new social norms to replace those of the sovereign.  It is important to 
recognize, however, that Web 2.0 communities, such as wikis and social 
networks, represent a real and significant manifestation of the exceptionalist 
vision, because they both facilitate a market in norms and values, and provide 
the internal enforcement mechanisms necessary for internal norms to emerge.  
Section 230 plays a vital role in the development of these communities by 
                                                     
21 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
22 Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:EN:NOT. 
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substantially and continually mitigating the primacy of external legal norms 
within the confines of the community.  This permits choice, empowers the 
intermediary to create a market in social norms, and allows alternate forms and 
gradations of enforcement.  The architecture of the community gives these 
choices form and substance, backed by an enforcement model, such that 
communal norms have the opportunity to develop.  In this sense, Section 230 
and the Web 2.0 model effectuate the emergence of a modified form of 
exceptionalism.  The reforms proposed by most commentators would have a 
negative impact on these communities, with little benefit beyond those 
communal norms that are likely to emerge, and should be rejected. 
Exceptionalism, Self-Governance & Social Norms 
Exceptionalism does not argue for the absence of social norms.  Instead, 
exceptionalism embraces the idea of cyberspace as an environment in which the 
authority of external legal regimes is minimal, and where an open market in 
norms and values works in concert with self-governance to permit the online 
community to establish its own substantive social norms.  Section 230 helps to 
effectuate a modified form of exceptionalism by moderating the imposition of 
external legal norms so as to permit a limited range of choices—bounded, at 
least, by criminal law, intellectual property law and contract law—in which the 
online community is free to create its own norms and rules of conduct.  
However, the development of social norms within this environment requires 
not only the ability to exercise broad individual choice among different values 
and embodiments of those values, but also some mechanism of communal 
enforcement through which to effectuate some form of self-governance. 
Early proponents of exceptionalism were able to focus on relational libertarian 
ideals, viewing the Internet as a unique social space in which norms governing 
thought, expression, identity, and relationship should be permitted to evolve.  
This focus developed precisely because the mechanisms of enforcement 
required for self-governance and the evolving definition of emergent social 
norms were taken for granted.  The architecture of enforcement was primarily 
controlled by a community involved in the process as adherents to the 
exceptionalist ideal, who could be trusted both to ensure broad individual 
choice and to utilize the means of enforcement as a tool of self-governance as 
norms emerged.   
As a means of effectuating exceptionalism, the primary weakness of Section 230 
is the lack of an enforcement component.  Although the modified 
exceptionalism enabled by Section 230 permits a range of choices, it does 
nothing to provide enforcement mechanisms to solidify emerging communal 
norms.  Where immunity exists, legal enforcement mechanisms are never 
triggered.  Likewise, the architecture of enforcement relied upon by early 
exceptionalists is no longer communal or likely committed to the vision of a 
distinct cyber-libertarian space, but is instead concentrated in private 
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commercial entities.  As a consequence, Section 230 immunity creates a gap: 
Certain external legal norms are excluded, but internal communal norms are 
often unable to coalesce to take their place.  It is this gap, resulting from the 
lack of architectural enforcement controls, which fuels criticism of the 
immunity provision.  In application, however, an enforcement model has 
emerged that mediates the tension between the broad availability of individual 
value choices and the ability to effectively self-govern so as to permit the 
development of communal norms. 
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism 
Web 2.0 communities are structured as a limited commons and are built on an 
architecture of participation that operates as a platform for user-created content 
and collaboration.  At the core are principles of open communication, 
decentralized authority, the freedom to share and re-use, and an idea of the 
Internet as a social forum or market for exchanging opinions and ideas in search 
of norms to create a culture based on sharing.  Section 230 plays a vital role in 
the development and maintenance of these architectures by providing 
intermediaries with limited immunity from liability for the tortious content 
provided by users.  Indeed, in this sense, Section 230 seems to favor the 
development of Web 2.0 services and the provision of user-based content over 
the traditional model of providing first-party institutional content. 
The parallels between Web 2.0 and Barlow’s vision of a communal social space 
are evident, albeit in modified form.  Barlow embraced the potential of an 
environment premised upon freedom of choice in individual expression, human 
behavior and relationships.  To achieve that potential, he and others believed 
that regulation by existing sovereign powers must be rejected in favor of self-
governance, so that new communal social norms might have the opportunity to 
emerge.  At the heart of this ideal was an affirmation that values participation in 
the market of expression, ideas and action without the constraint of 
preconceived value judgments.  Web 2.0 promises a somewhat limited version 
of this environment—existing within sovereign authority, narrowed by certain 
enduring norms, and confined to segmented communities administered by 
private entities—by facilitating the market by which norms are tested. 
Two of the most common models of these Web 2.0 services, wikis and social 
networks, are indicative of how Section 230 can effectuate the modified form of 
cyber-libertarian exceptionalism described above.  Partly as a result of the 
immunity from liability provided by Section 230, these services facilitate the 
market in social norms by creating enclaves in which users may exercise broad 
(although not unbounded) individual choice among competing values.  At the 
same time, the intermediary retains control over the architecture and thus the 
means of enforcement.  As the market defines social good through the 
evolution of communal norms, that architecture may be employed as a 
mechanism of governance.  In the absence of legal incentives, the enforcement 
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of communal norms is driven by internal incentives, such as the need for 
financial support from community donations, a communal desire for 
information integrity, or the need to build an audience for advertising.  In some 
communities, participants may be incentivized by credibility and stature in the 
form of temporal seniority, post count, rank within the community’s governing 
body, etc.   
The online encyclopedia Wikipedia is a specific example of a Web 2.0 
community of collective action.  Each entry in the Wikipedia database is created 
and edited by volunteers who are guided by three primary principles: the 
Neutral Point of View policy, the No Original Research policy, and the 
Verifiability policy.  Registered users can originate new articles, and any user, 
whether registered or anonymous, can edit an existing article.  In the period 
between Wikipedia’s inception in 2001 and 2010, this experiment in voluntary 
collaborative action produced more than ten million articles.   
These activities are overseen by two levels of administrators, administrators and 
bureaucrats.  Administrators (historically called sysops, short for system 
operators) have the power to edit pages, delete or undelete articles and article 
histories, protect pages, and block or unblock user accounts or IP addresses.  
Bureaucrats have the further power to create additional sysops with the 
approval of the community.  In February 2006, in response to a series of 
significant and persistent acts of vandalism, the co-founder of Wikipedia created 
an additional layer of protection: Administrators can protect any article so that 
all future changes must be approved by an administrator.23  Administrators help 
facilitate dispute resolution and enforcement.  Low-level disputes are resolved 
in talk pages.  Here, moderators guide members to resolution with reference to 
policies and guidelines developed over the life of the community.  Thus, 
principle values and norms can lead to more specific rules.  This approach 
works in most cases.  More serious violations, such as malicious editing of an 
article (or vandalism), are addressed through fast-repair mechanisms executed 
by community members.  Wikipedia administrators are also able to block user 
accounts or IP addresses.   
As described, the Wikipedia community reflects a modified form of the 
exceptionalist model, initially allowing for individual choice among a range of 
values, facilitating a market in social norms, and providing a means of 
enforcement to effectuate norms as they develop.  Indeed, recent studies reflect 
not only that norms have emerged from this market, but that those norms have 
solidified and expanded.  Through this process, the Wikipedia community is 
                                                     
23 See Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Protection Policy, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Protection_policy (last accessed Dec. 1, 
2010). 
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moving from an immediate focus on particular articles to more generalized 
concerns for quality of content and community.   
Not unexpectedly, open source projects such as Wikipedia are not immune to 
abuse.  In terms of community health, and to protect against these abuses, 
Wikipedia has adopted a code of conduct and principles of etiquette that stress 
civility and discourage personal attacks.  As discussed above, these norms are 
enforced through an architecture that is designed to reinforce those norms with 
an eye towards the health of the community.  At the most basic level, this 
occurs through routine editing by participants.  Over time, more complex 
mechanisms for dispute resolution and enforcement have developed, such that 
in the past few years administrative and coordination activities have gained 
importance.   
The relationship between architecture and social norms is fascinatingly apparent 
both in the Wikipedia’s architectural choice to track and correlate the IP address 
of any anonymous user who edits the encyclopedia, as well as the development 
of a monitoring system that tracks those changes for analysis.  This system 
serves as a mechanism for enforcing social norms, particularly the norm of 
neutrality in more controversial areas.  In terms of more formal enforcement, 
some edits that might previously have been overlooked are now being 
reexamined in light of the organization from which they originated.  Less 
formally, but perhaps even more effectively, organizations which are perceived 
to have breached the norms of the community have faced, and will face, 
recriminations.  Moreover, the entire community is now aware that enforcement 
of those norms is now more effective, presumably creating a deterrence effect. 
The Wikipedia example illuminates a constant process, as choices are narrowed 
by communal norms that develop and are given life through enforcement 
mechanisms, such that principle norms generate a breadth of more particular 
rules.  Section 230 immunity plays an important role in this process, permitting 
the community to evolve and structure itself in the most efficient manner.  To a 
limited extent, Section 230 immunity permits uncoordinated and uncoerced 
individual choice among different values and among different embodiments of 
those values.  It further allows the intermediary to play an active role in 
facilitating the market in social norms and in creating enforcement mechanisms 
as a tool of self-governance.  Those enforcement mechanisms can then 
themselves adapt.  This allows not only for the development of distinct 
community values, but also for a means of tapping into incentives, adapting to 
evolving norms and conditions, and reducing costs associated with disputes.  
Within this framework, greater variations in community norms are possible.  As 
communities grow, niche communities are formed at low cost.  It is not the 
global vision of early exceptionalism, but rather a more limited and localized 
form of modified exceptionalism that functions as a laboratory for testing social 
norms and values. 
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Conclusion 
Critics of Section 230 have both overstated the harms arising from immunity 
and understated the costs of alternate schemes for imposing indirect liability on 
online intermediaries.  At the same time, they have ignored the important role 
Section 230 plays in the development of online communities.  The immunity 
provided by Section 230 helps to create the initial conditions necessary for the 
development of a modified form of exceptionalism by mitigating the effect of 
external legal norms in the online environment.  Web 2.0 communities are then 
able to facilitate a market in norms and provide the architectural enforcement 
mechanisms that give emerging norms substance.  Given Section 230’s crucial 
role in this process, and the growing importance of Web 2.0 communities in 
which collaborative production is yielding remarkable results, reforming the 
statute to substantially narrow the grant of immunity is both unnecessary and 
unwise. 
